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Abstract 
 
The present paper is an essay about the future of aid, understood as a global, durable, social 
phenomenon. Special attention is attached to the issue of governance, both the governance of 
aid itself, and institutional reforms in the recipient countries. A short review of literature on 
the topic serves to support a general thesis that the stream of aid is a stream of capital, and 
that natural possession of that capital confers palpable economic power to whatever social 
agent holds it temporarily in the field of their discretionary decision. Both theoretical, and 
empirical development of the subject is then conducted in order to show that the main cause 
of unsatisfactory institutional changes in the recipient countries is the fact that aid disturbs the 
already frail balance between legitimation and economic power in emergent societies. In 
conclusion, a new paradigm of governing aid is proposed, centred on building legitimation for 
aid itself, i.e. on using the known experience and history to construe a broad, consistent, 
normative base for aid programmes. The theory of justice, as proposed by John Rawls, seems 
to be the right starting point for establishing the primary rules of that normative base. As for 
the secondary ones, a new institution, namely international arbitration of claims related to aid, 
is proposed as an interesting solution for progressively building the secondary rules of 
recognition, in the legitimation of aid.       
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What is the future of aid? What amounts of aid will be necessary in the future? What does it 
mean “necessary aid”, at the bottom line? What kinds of social change can we reasonably 
expect as the outcome of aid? What is unpredictable about social changes connected to aid? 
These are the big questions that most people concerned with aid use to ask. The present paper 
attempts to answer them partly, with a strong focus on public governance, and on the impact 
that aid has on the governments of recipient countries. 
Aid and social change 
 
Quite a rich body of literature indicates that changing the institutions of recipient countries, 
which in the jargon of aid is called “capacity building”, is the most frequent failure of aid 
programmes. Still, the problem seems to me more the way aid is given rather than received. 
The donors seem to have a systematic problem with walking in the recipients’ shoes (see for 
example: Moss et al. 2006; Knack and Eubank 2009; Barder 2006; Birdsall 2007; Kaufmann 
2009). Whilst failing in capacity building, aid is indubitably salutary for the poor (Hirano, 
Otsubo 2014). The general problem with the donors’ impact upon the emergence of 
institutions in recipient countries is that the latter, as a rule, do not want that. For example, the 
growing movement of South-South development cooperation (SSDC) is strongly attached to 
the argument that aid is often used as a neo-colonial tool by developed countries – imposing 
unreasonable constraints on developing countries and tying aid to commercial, political and 
military interests of the donors (Reality of Aid Management Committee 2010). Probably the 
best example of the gap between the expectations of donors, and the actual institutional 
capacity of the recipients is the process of constitution making in African countries. A number 
of authors argue that the process has been, so far, largely an attempt to implement, in African 
societies, institutions fundamentally different from the African tradition. The process can be 
compared to someone picking up food from an elaborate buffet, in which they don’t recognize 
anything really familiar (Seidman 1987). An excellent example is centralization. Most of the 
early African constitutions were based on the Western institution of central government 
legitimated by the nation. Still, pre-colonial African societies worked in a different manner: 
the bulk of legitimacy was attached to local chiefs of individual villages, whilst any type of 
central, national government was rather of the ephemeral kind, and nobody truly cared to 
legitimate it (Ndulo 2001). Thus, principles of centralization that emerge in African countries 
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are, as a matter of fact, a big experiment, which frequently results in excessive concentration 
of power in the hands of the otherwise quite unstably legitimated President of the Republic. 
Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Zambia are good examples.  
Facing the challenge of helping the poor, and, in the same time, not to hamper the institutional 
development of the recipient countries, the usual donors’ response is to seek improvement of 
the policies applied. A fine example of this approach is to find, for example, in Radelet 
(2004). The present paper proposes a completely different, novel paradigm of aid. Fault of a 
better word, we can call this paradigm “orientation on principles”, as opposed to orientation 
on policies. Aid is a long-lasting, global phenomenon. Using the terms of systems theory, in 
the footsteps of Nicklas Luhmann, we can assume that aid had reached the stage of 
operational closure already some time ago (Luhmann 1992). Both its accumulated experience, 
and its actual complexity call for passing from the governance based mostly on goal-oriented 
policies to the one grounded in a well-legitimated, normative base. 
On the grounds of the agency theory, it is possible to assume that the natural possession1 of 
capital can be the source of social power that we will further name “economic power” (see: 
Berle, Means 1932; Wilson 1968; Berhold 1971; 1973; Jensen, Meckling 1976; Fama, Jensen 
1983). Capital shapes social structures, and social structures shape capital (see for example 
Piketty 2013). Any hierarchical, social structure – states and corporations included - is able to 
sustain itself over long periods of time if it has both legitimation, and economic power. The 
concept of legitimation, as introduced here, is basically the same than that used by Max 
Weber (Weber 1920), and H.L.A. Hart (Hart 1961), but mostly that of Jürgen Habermas 
(Habermas 1975, 1979, 1996). Society needs stabilization in order to deliver the most benefits 
from association. Social stabilization requires a set of generally recognized rules of conduct. 
Some of them are formalized as legal rules, whilst other are the less formalized moral rules. 
Generally recognized rules do not emerge randomly. They require a gradual process of social 
mediation, and communication. That process has its roots in language, which serves as the 
medium for the discursive emergence of legitimate rules. It is worth to explain the link 
between legitimation, and legitimacy. Those two terms are sometimes used interchangeably, 
yet a nuance is to notice. Legitimacy is a state of society at the given moment, whilst 
legitimation is rather a process. Legitimation brings legitimacy, so to say. 
As the stream of aid is allocated, distributed, and received, many social agents are in the 
temporary, natural possession of the capital goods that aid represents. Correspondingly, many 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 By natural possession we understand the bare fact of possessing a certain set of goods, abstraction made of the exact legal 
claim on those goods.  
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opportunities for economic power arise. Each of them, besides the economic power strictly 
spoken, is characterized by a certain legitimation, and, consequently, by a certain level of 
stability. Legitimation of the political system is essentially incremental, i.e. emerging as the 
result of a long, complex social process, with strong connection to law, and morality. In the 
ideal state, there is equilibrium between legitimation, and economic power, resulting in well-
grounded political power. From that state of equilibrium, the political system may drift 
toward two extremes: legitimation without economic power, or economic power over and 
above the scope of legitimation. The mechanism of sliding off the neighbourhood of 
equilibrium seems to be attached mostly to the changes in economic power. Legitimation 
changes slowly, whilst economic power can change faster. One can grasp that difference by 
comparing the pace, at which constitutions change, with that, at which consecutive, annual 
budgets are voted.  
Governments are structures, not monoliths. They are structured institutionally, and 
sociologically. The latter is the most interesting at this point. The public sector is a population 
of people, who in the first place are people as such, with their individual goals, and strategies 
to achieve them. Those people associate in more or less formal ways, forming coalitions, 
lobbies, clubs, parties etc. Thus, when we talk about the political power of the government, 
we mean the power held, acquired and played by many people. A game-theoretic approach 
can be used to model the transformation of individual strategies into collective political action 
(see for example: Harsanyi 1953; 1966; 1967; 1968). 
The capital brought by the stream of aid can influence the political system in two basic ways. 
Firstly, it can enter de facto into the fiscal equation of the public sector, thus increasing its 
overall economic power. Conversely, aid may remain out of actual reach of public agents, in 
the hands of NGOs with well-grounded independence. Yet, those NGOs also found their 
social power on the economic power conferred by the natural possession of capital goods, as 
conveyed by the stream of aid. The point of the argumentation is that any social structure, 
which spends the capital coming from aid, has come economic power grounded in that 
capital. The crucial component of the overall social benefits of aid is the actual legitimation 
combined with that economic power. Given the previously cited body of research, the basic 
problem (and basic challenge) is to prevent the development of “feral” economic power, lying 
outside of the scope of legitimation. 
Now, let’s pass to the properly spoken empirical proof of the important assumption that aid is 
a stream of capital. Its logic is to demonstrate the correlation between the stream of aid 
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received by recipient countries, and the processes of capital formation in their economies. 
Two sources of information have been used, namely:  
a) The database of aid flows as published by the World Bank under the title of “Aid 
Effectiveness” database2  
b) The database World Economic Outlook (WEO) April 2014  
The variables that describe capital formation are: the share of gross gross national savings in 
the GNI, and that of private investment. As for the measure of aid intensity, two variables 
have been chosen, namely: the share of ODA in the GNI, and in gross capital formation.  
Among the 177 countries recipient of aid, according to the World Bank, 65 countries have 
been selected, on the grounds of statistics regarding the formation of capital, as provided by 
the International Monetary Fund, for the period 1980 through 2012. The detailed composition 
of the sample is provided in Table	  2, in the Appendix. As the country-level datasets display 
quite a disparate volume3, the general strategy of econometric analysis was not to account for 
fixed effects at the country level in the subsequent econometric test. A preliminary test of 
inter-correlation among the variables measuring the aid intensity revealed a strong mutual 
dependence, with a Pearson correlation coefficient of r = 0,501. Linear, OLS regression of the 
ODA share in the GNI over its share in gross capital formation brought a coefficient of 
regression β = 4,694, with a standard error of (1,006), and significant at p < 0,001. The 
constant term in that regression is 5,17, with a standard error of (3,83), and the test T 
significant at p = 0,177. In a general manner, inter-correlation between the two variables 
measuring intensity of aid is of the kind “too strong to ignore; too weak to ignore”. Moreover, 
there has to be an assumption of significantly different saving rates between countries. Thus, 
both variables have been kept as explanatory variables in the following test of regression. In 
order to provide for the possible non-stationary distribution of data, it had been transformed 
with the classical, Box-Cox logarithmic transformation had been judged appropriate (Box, 
Cox 1964).  
Table 1 below shows the results of three basic tests of linear, OLS regression. In a general 
manner, the intensity of aid has significant impact upon the accumulation of both private and 
publicly held capital in the recipient countries.  
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 http://data.worldbank.org/topic/aid-effectiveness  
3 For example, Vietnam and Costa Rica could be studied just over two consecutive years each. Table 4, in the Appendix, 
presents the number of observation years for each country. Observation ends in 2012, with the exception of Syria, where the 
end year is 2010.  
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Table 1 
Explained variable: Gross national savings % of GNI 
N = 736, R2 = 0,268 
Explanatory variable Coefficient of regression Robust standard error T Student significance level 
Net ODA received as % of 
gross capital formation 
- 0,565 (0,085) p < 0,001 
Net ODA received as % of the 
GNI 
0,58 (0,122) p < 0,001 
Constant term 3,498 (0,041) p < 0,001 
    
Explained variable: Private investment % of GNI 
N = 751, R2 = 0,439 
Explanatory variable Coefficient of regression Robust standard error T Student significance level 
Net ODA received as % of 
gross capital formation 
- 0,533 (0,031) p < 0,001 
Net ODA received as % of the 
GNI 
0,714 (0,044) p < 0,001 
Constant term 3,448 (0,022) p < 0,001 
Source:	  author’s	  
 
High intensity of aid in relation to GNI stimulates the formation of private savings, and that of 
productive assets. Conversely, high intensity of aid in relation to gross capital formation 
hampers the accumulation of private capital. Clearly, inter-correlation between the two 
explanatory variables measuring the intensity of aid has limits. It seems that with relatively 
low savings rates in the given country, when the flow of ODA makes a substantial part of 
gross capital formation, ODA crowds out private capital in some manner. It is worth noting 
that results of the tests shown in Table 1 are strongly sensitive to sample selection. Focusing 
on just one quartile of any of the variables significantly changes both the explanatory power 
as measured with R2, and the T significance of tests, yet not the signs of coefficients. Thus, 
strong idiosyncrasies are to expect in the sample, probably at the country level.  
Justice first – principles before policies  
 
The influence of aid upon the recipient societies depends mostly on its intensity, i.e. on the 
relative importance of capital provided through aid in proportion to the national income, and 
to the domestic formation of private capital. Among the biggest recipients of aid, only some 
receive it in amounts intensive enough to expect any social change at all. India, China, 
Indonesia, Philippines – these are only a few examples of huge absorption of aid accompanied 
by so low an intensity that expecting any significant change in response would be irrational. 
Simplifying a little, two distinct cases of aid are to consider. On the one hand, there are those 
big, low-intensity recipients, where aid does its primary job, namely equalizing social 
opportunities. On the other hand, there are the high-intensity recipients, where aid works as a 
factor of overall shift toward a new social order. Those high-intensity cases are usually 
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emergent societies. They are either emergent in the strict sense of the word (e.g. Eritrea), or 
just profoundly shaken by recent, historical events (e.g. Iraq). Those societies tend to 
experiment with the established institutional patterns, and create completely new ones. That 
tendency to institutional experimentation is well confirmed, both by empirical research cite in 
the introduction, and by a somewhat forgotten strand of social theory (Heath 1957; McCallum 
1970). Those emerging, experimenting societies are those, which the most frequently receive 
the label of “insufficient capacity building” when it comes to the assessment of results.  
The exact role of aid in the recipient society depends mostly on the intensity of aid, as 
measured in amount per capita, or relatively to the national income. The greater the intensity 
of aid, the greater the probability that besides its elementary function of alleviating poverty, it 
becomes fully grown capital that gets accumulated and serves economic power. Trying to 
predict, plan, and possibly enforce any kind of social changes more complex than, for 
example, the bare fact of building 20 new schools is irrational, as far as the outcomes of aid 
programmes are concerned. It is impossible to plan, externally, complex institutional changes 
in emergent, self-experimenting societies, which are the recipients of the most intensive aid 
per capita. One of their greatest institutional challenges is to find relatively durable, and 
sustainable equilibrium between the slowly changing legitimation, and the quickly changing 
economic power of governments. Successful absorption of foreign institutional patterns might 
be just an event of the “en passant” type. The more intense is the stream of aid per capita, the 
more likely it is to push the political system out of its precarious balance. Pockets of 
illegitimate economic power, gone feral, and derived from the stream of aid, keep on 
emerging in those countries. On the other hand, in many areas of public mission, their 
governments stay economically weak regarding their scope of legitimation.  
The situation, in which we cannot reliably predict the full social outcomes of a given policy 
resembles strongly to the veil of ignorance, as defined by John Rawls4. The present edssay 
proposes a paradigm of governing aid definitely oriented on the theory of justice as proposed 
by John Rawls. The intuition behind the paradigm proposed is that aid, as a global, social 
phenomenon, has grown old enough to gain its own balance between economic power, and 
legitimation. The key step to take now is to build legitimation. It is once more worth noticing 
that legitimation is not the same as legitimacy. The proposition to build legitimation for aid 
does not mean that aid has no legitimacy. Legitimation means that the so far history of the 
given social action has allowed building a broad normative base. Following H.L.A. Hart (Hart 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 For a more substantial development see: Rawls, J., 1999, A Theory of Justice. Revised Edition, The Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Chapter I “Justice as Fairness”, §4 ‘The Original Position and Justification’, pp. 15 - 19 
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1961), we can assume that the normative base of aid should consist of both the primary rules 
of conduct, and of the secondary rules of recognition.  
So far, aid is policy-oriented, thus mostly utilitarian, in the sense developed through 
successive works of David Hume (1739, 1751), Adam Smith (1759, 1776), Jeremy Bentham 
(1789), John Stuart Mill (1844, 1879), and Henry Sidgwick (1907). A noticeable, modern 
development of utilitarianism is to be found in the so-called economic analysis of law (see for 
example: Coase 1960; Brown 1973; Posner 1975, 1979, 1980).  
Utilitarian approach requires predictability. Still, most aid programmes are haunted by 
something, that fault of a better word, can be called “the paradox of consistent volatility”. On 
the one hand, it is beyond any doubt that aid is a durable, social phenomenon, and has a 
significant place in the recipient societies. On the other hand, any particular aid program 
always contains that principle of “sustainable results”, which means that the social change 
brought by aid should be able to live a life of its own as if aid was to be removed at any 
moment. Consequently, we have a paradox: we manage a social action present through 
decades of history as if it was to end tomorrow. 
Now, let’s pass to a positive description of governing aid on the grounds of John Rawls’s 
theory of justice. The normative base of primary rules should rest, of course, on the two 
principles of justice, as Rawls defines them. For the sake of theoretical completeness, let’s 
remind them. The first principle states that each person is to have an equal right to the most 
extensive scheme of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for 
others. The second principle is the following: social and economic inequalities are to be 
arranged so that they are both reasonably expected to be to everyone’s advantage, and 
attached to positions and offices open to all. The complete theory of justice assumes lexical 
order of those principles, so that the second one has any relevance only insofar the first 
principle is satisfied. Yet, the exact problem that we want to address is that many, if not most 
of aid programs have to operate in a political environment that does not fully comply with the 
first principle. Aid is focused on distributive justice as encompassed by the second principle, 
yet it cannot make the whole recipient society more just. Justice is to be sought and found in 
the very way of donating and distributing aid. The main, long-term goal is to gain durable, 
sustainable legitimation for aid as a global project.  
John Rawls wasn’t really explicit on the practical ways of implementing his theory, and on 
defining the secondary rules of recognition for actual institutions. As for that aspect, the 
works of Ronald Dworkin, more precisely his critique of the utilitarian approach to law, 
provide really useful guidelines (see for example: Dworkin 1975, 1980). The key 
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recommendations to borrow from Dworkin’s approach are the following: put principles 
before goals, construct principles into institutions, make those institutions so as to allow 
adjudicating hard cases independently of policy setting.  
Thus, the most important step to make consists in using the known history of aid over the last 
six decades in order to identify the typical conflicts of interests that arise in connection to aid, 
and to construe a consistent set of rules, possibly recognized as binding rules of international 
law, to solve those conflicts. The core idea is that, although we cannot remove the paradox of 
consistent volatility from aid, we should use the quite abundant history of aid as a source of 
inspiration for the future. The typical field of regulation for such rules would probably the 
issue know today as “capacity building”. The donors expect the institutional changes to go in 
some definite direction, whilst the recipient country changes in another, divergent direction. Is 
it fair? Is it just? Should it be the grounds for stopping the flow of aid or reducing it 
significantly? Today, such conflicts are set at the level of policy making. With all the due 
respect for the policy makers, the problem is that of a snake biting its tail, over and over 
again. The policy makers keep on returning to the same starting point in planning institutional 
changes in the recipient countries, with a very limited capacity to learn on mistakes. 
Adjudication, separate and independent from policy-making, is probably the best, 
institutionalized way to learn on past conflicts and past mistakes. Thus, an international 
arbitration body could be created to settle disputes that arise on the grounds of conflicting 
interests in aid programmes. That would create a completely different, institutional setting. 
First of all, it would allow the existence of legal claims concerning aid, in the global 
population of donors and recipients. Such an international arbitration could settle, for 
example, conflicts of interests between NGOs and governments, in the recipient countries, as 
for the actual control over the stream of aid. Similarly, conflicts arising from overlapping aid 
programmes could be settled through such international arbitration. There is strong evidence 
that international arbitration can contribute to building new institutions. The controversial 
area of investor-state dispute settlement is an example of new norms forming through 
adjudication 	  (Nottage	  2006;	  Bjorklund	  2009;	  Schill	  2011) 
Someone could say: “Lawyers again? No, thanks!” Of course, creating a new system of 
international arbitration would create much controversy in the beginning. All international 
courts did, actually. Yet, it is worth once again to bring forth the main argument: aid, as a 
global activity, needs globally recognized, and the only way to create such a legitimation is to 
learn consistently on past experience and to communicate that learning in a consistent 
manner.  
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Appendix	  
	  
	  
Table	  2	  Sample	  of	  countries	  used	  for	  the	  panel-­‐data	  analysis	  of	  capital	  formation	  
Country	   Number	  of	  year-­‐
observations5	  
Country	   Number	  of	  year-­‐
observations	   Country	   Number	  of	  year-­‐observations	  Algeria	   12	   India	   22	   Panama	   10	  Bahrain	   23	   Indonesia	   13	   Peru	   13	  Bangladesh	   10	   Islamic	  Republic	   of	  Iran	   17	   Quatar	   23	  Belize	   11	   Jordan	   25	   Saudi	  Arabia	   14	  Bolivia	   13	   Kazakhstan	   11	   Senegal	   13	  Bosnia	   and	  Herzegovina	   15	   Kenya	   15	   Serbia	   13	  Brazil	   13	   Lebanon	   13	   Seychelles	   12	  Burkina	  Faso	   11	   Lesotho	   8	   Sierra	  Leone	   13	  Cameroon	   13	   Liberia	   13	   Solomon	  Islands	   10	  Cape	  Verde	   11	   Libya	   23	   South	  Africa	   13	  Chile	   21	   Malawi	   8	   St.	   Vincent	   and	   the	  Grenadines	   23	  China	   29	   Maldives	   16	   Swaziland	   12	  Colombia	   14	   Mali	   13	   Syria	   21	  Costa	  Rica	   2	   Mexico	   15	   Thailand	   17	  Cote	  d'Ivoire	   16	   Montenegro	   5	   Trinidad	   and	  Tobago	   13	  Egypt	   11	   Morocco	   17	   Turkey	   11	  Ethiopia	   21	   Namibia	   7	   Uganda	   16	  FYR	  Macedonia	   14	   Nicaragua	   16	   Ukraine	   15	  Fiji	   21	   Niger	   18	   United	   Arab	  Emirates	   14	  Ghana	   12	   Nigeria	   13	   Uruguay	   10	  Guyana	   6	   Pakistan	   11	   Vietnam	   3	  	   	   Zambia	   8	   Yemen	   14	  
Source:	  author’s	  
	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 All observations end at 2012, so the total length of the observation period, for the given country is 2012 minus the number 
provided in the table. Syria is an exception, with observation ending at 2010. 
